Ammonius · thesis 16.1

Thesis 16.1

Latin

Diffinitio de anima data ab Aristotele in qua dicitur: Anima est actus corporis, cum de rationali, de qua principaliter datur, intelligitur, accipienda est causaliter non formaliter.

Copy-text: Farmer 1998, line 14474

English

Aristotle's definition of the soul — that the soul is the actuality of the body — when it is understood of the rational soul, for which it is chiefly given, must be taken causally, not formally.

Sense checked against farmer1998:14509; 'actus' kept as 'actuality' rather than 'act' to preserve the Aristotelian technical sense.

Translation: machine-drafted 2026-09-26 by TRANSLATOR-T03b; sense checked against farmer1998:14509; awaiting human check

Attribution: reported according to Ammonius (section 16 of the historical theses) · Pico's stance: reports

Farmer's cross-references

• 1.7 Sonus fertur secundum esse reale usque ad principium nerui auditiui.
• 2.1 Si spiritus a filio non procederet, a filio non distingueretur.
• 2.29 In generatione substantiali fit resolutio usque ad materiam primam.
• 2>12 Esse corporeum non habet res ab aliqua forma substantiali uel gradu
• 2>70 Corpus organicum, quod est materia animae_et ponitur in diffinitione eius ab Aristotele, est corpus et organicum per formam essentialiter di
• 3>50 Sola materia sufficit ad id saluandum, cuius gratia Aristoteles et alii philosophi priuationem inter principia naturalia posuerunt.
• 3>51 Tria sunt principia rerum naturalium: materia, motus, et forma.